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RETHINKING PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS: A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
Elizabeth R. Carter*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Premarital Agreement.
Prenuptial Agreement.
Matrimonial Agreement.
Antenuptial Agreement.
Whatever they choose to call it, every couple contemplating marriage
should also contemplate a premarital agreement. Yet, scholars and lawyers have told
us to be wary of premarital agreements—unfairly characterizing them as being
coercive, unfair, sexist, unromantic, and even predictors of future divorce.1 Critics
argue, and the law often presumes, that default marital property laws benefit
women—an argument that is outdated, at best. Modifications of the default rules,
they claim, must be viewed critically in order to prevent women—who are typically
in an economically inferior position—from being harmed. In order to protect a
woman from the harms of negotiating with her economically superior spouse, the
common law grants courts expansive authority to review marriage contracts for
procedural and substantive fairness.
This approach—the approach taken by most major common law
jurisdictions—causes more harm than good. It is premised on several sexist and
faulty presumptions and it is rarely supported by any actual data. In an effort to
protect women from their own ignorance, weakness, and stupidity, the common law
creates barriers to entering into premarital agreements that fail to achieve any
meaningful protection. The legal profession—in viewing entry into a premarital
agreement as an antagonistic process—has erected additional ethical barriers to
hiring an attorney to prepare a premarital agreement. For those couples that do decide
to pursue a marriage contract, the barriers put in place by the common law and by
the legal profession inject unnecessary expense and adversarial decision-making to
what could—and should—be a relatively inexpensive and collaborative process.
Common law and the legal profession have, in a sense, created a self-fulfilling
* Judge Anthony J. Graphia & Jo Ann Graphia Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State
University. B.A., B.S., University of Memphis; J.D., Tulane University; LL.M., University of Alabama.
Yes, my husband and I do have a premarital agreement.
1. E.g., Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
229, 240–52 (1994); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 65, 81–82 (1998); Jerome H. Poliacoff, What Does Love Have to Do with It?, 33 FAM. ADVOC.,
Winter 2011, at 13–14; Beth Potier, For Many, Prenups Seem to Predict Doom, HARV. U. GAZETTE (Oct.
16, 2003), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/10.16/01-prenup.html; Prenuptial Agreements: Are They
Necessary?
Two
Legal
Experts
Debate,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
14,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/14/prenuptial-agreements_n_1874636.html.
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prophecy. By adopting a dual-representation, dissolution-focused model for entering
into premarital agreements, we increase the chances that agreements will be coercive,
stressful, and will fail to reflect the expectations of the spouses.
I argue that these barriers are premised on sexist and outdated notions—
notions that typically do more harm than good. Removing these barriers and
empowering couples to decide how to arrange their financial affairs would have an
overall positive effect on relationship stability and equality of money management
within the relationship. Part II examines the traditional arguments against premarital
agreements and asserts that many of these arguments are outdated and unsupported
by current data. Part II also considers some of the benefits afforded by premarital
agreements. Part III examines the doctrine of unconscionability—one of the most
significant barriers to entry into and enforcement of premarital agreements. As Part
III explains, common law has created two proxies for assessing conscionability:
financial disclosure and independent legal representation. I argue that both proxies
are founded on misguided, paternalistic, and gendered notions. Part IV describes an
additional unnecessary barrier erected by the legal profession—Rule 1.7 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Part V describes a proposed collaborative
approach towards premarital agreements and concludes.
II.

PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED: SO
WHY AREN’T THEY?

Premarital agreements should be encouraged, socially accepted, and
relatively easy to enter into. Moreover, they ought to be viewed quite differently than
agreements that are entered into on the eve of divorce or separation. The objective
of a premarital agreement ought to be the success of the relationship—not its
dismantling. Premarital agreements have the potential for many benefits not afforded
by the default laws. When a divorce does occur, a premarital agreement can prevent
many of the stresses, costs, and time delays associated with a divorce.2 Premarital
agreements can easily provide more predictable alimony awards obviating the need
to expensive and speculative litigation.3 Premarital agreements could even result in
fairer outcomes at divorce because couples are usually able to bargain more
cooperatively when they are contemplating their marriage rather than ending it.4
Perhaps more importantly, premarital agreements may actually prevent
divorce by prompting a couple to better define and communicate their expectations
at the outset of the marriage.5 Couples who learn to communicate with each other
about financial decisions are more likely to have lasting and egalitarian
relationships.6 When both spouses participate fully in financial decisions their own
2. See Chelsea Biemiller, Note, The Uncertain Enforceability of Prenuptial Agreements: Why the
“Extreme” Approach in Pennsylvania is the Right Approach for Review, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 133, 161
(2013).
3. See Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About
Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 41, 77–78 (2011);
Biemiller, supra note 2, at 161.
4. See Biemiller, supra note 2, at 161–62.
5. See McMullen, supra note 3, at 77–78; Biemiller, supra note 2, at 162.
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Carter, The Illusion of Equality: The Failure of the Community Property
Reform to Achieve Management Equality, 48 IND. L. REV. 853, 857–60 (2015).
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wellbeing, and that of their children, is positively impacted.7 Yet, the default marital
property laws rarely require the joint participation of the spouses in financial
decisions.8
Many, if not most, criticisms of premarital agreements stem from an
underlying assumption that women are categorically in a weaker bargaining position
in both wanting to marry and in negotiating a premarital agreement. As a result,
scholars and practitioners conclude that premarital agreements are often harmful to
women and protections are needed. To that end, barriers have been erected to
entering into premarital agreements in order to protect the weaker spouse from her
own foolishness and overreaching by the other spouse. As I argue in Section III,
below, these barriers are unhelpful, unduly paternalistic, and prevent couples from
entering into useful agreements.
The most common criticism of premarital agreements is that they are onesided, unfair, and serve primarily to protect the economically superior spouse
(typically the man) to the detriment of the economically inferior spouse (typically
the woman). In support of this argument critics make several assumptions. First,
critics assume that some significant inequity exists between most prospective
spouses. Second, critics assume that the substance of a premarital agreement will
exacerbate those inequities. Third, critics assume that the default marital property
laws are categorically more beneficial to the disadvantaged spouse than the rules
contained in the premarital agreement. I will address each assumption in turn.
A.

Significant Bargaining Inequity: Fact or Fiction?

The fundamental assumption made by most critics is that premarital
agreements “involv[e] parties who are usually not evenly matched in bargaining
power”.9 While this assumption may have been true historically, it has lost footing
in recent years. Disparities in education, disparities in age, and disparities in income
have often been pointed to by critics as indicators of inequity.10 These demographic
indicators, however, no longer support the assumption that women are categorically
disadvantaged when bargaining with their prospective husbands. Some critics have
also argued that women are in an inferior bargaining position because women, on
average, have a higher demand for marriage than men.11 Again, the data supporting
this argument is outdated as it relies heavily on changed demographic factors.12 This
is not to say, of course, that inequities do not persist. Rather, the remaining inequities
fail to support the categorical conclusion that women are in a noticeably inferior
position when bargaining for premarital agreements. Women today are more evenly
matched with their prospective spouses than at any other time in recent history.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 882–87.
9. Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1061
(1988).
10. See Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital
Agreements, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 187 (1996); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 447–53 (1992).
11. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 545–46 (1998).
12. See id. at 546–49.
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The institution of marriage has undergone a radical transformation in the
past century.13 On the one hand, marriage rates have declined significantly. On the
other hand, the characteristics of those people who do chose to marry put them on
more even footing than in years past. Those couples who do marry today are older,
better educated, and closer in age than in years past. Table 1 illustrates this point by
showing changes in age at first marriage and the age gap by decade. Today, “[m]ost
couples are similar in age, and most individuals prefer a potential partner to be
similar in age.”14
Table 1: Age at First Marriage15
Year

Male

Female

Age
Gap

1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

24.3
22.8
22.8
23.2
24.7
26.1
26.8
28.2

21.5
20.3
20.3
20.8
22.0
23.9
25.1
26.1

2.8
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.7
2.2
1.7
2.1

While the decline in the age disparity between spouses is not dramatic, the
increased median age hints at a bigger story. As of 2010, the median age at first
marriage was 28.2 for men and 26.1 for women—ages significantly higher than
earlier decades. First marriages are now typically delayed until after college is
completed and careers are begun.
Table 2: Marriage and Education16
Educational Level
College
Graduate or Higher
Some
College

%
1960

Married

%
2008

Married

76

64

69

50

% Decline from
1960-2008
12%
19%

13. See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR
HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005); John Borneman, Marriage Today, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 30
(2005); Kristen Harknett & Arielle Kuperberg, Education, Labor Markets and the Retreat from Marriage,
90 SOC. FORCES 41 (2011).
14. Michael J. Rosenfeld & Reuben J. Thomas, Searching for a Mate: The Rise of the Internet as a
Social Intermediary, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 523, 539 (2012).
15. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE MS-2. ESTIMATED MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, BY
SEX: 1890 TO PRESENT (2011), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms2.xls.
16. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families 11 (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf.
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24%

College graduation has become an important predictor of marriage—for
both spouses. College graduates in 1960 were only slightly more likely to be married
than their peers who either had some college or a high school education or less.17 As
Table 2 demonstrates, the decline in marriage rates has disproportionately affected
those with lower educational attainment. As of 2008, college-educated individuals
were about 15% more likely to be married than their less-educated peers. The
relationship between marriage and college education is revealing in light of the
shifting gender gaps in college education. The male-female gap hit a highpoint in
1947 when men outnumbered women in college 2.3 to 1.18 Women began to catch
up. By 1980 more Americans enrolled in colleges than in the past and men and
women entered college at equal rates.19 The gender gap in college is actually reversed
today with women outnumbering and outperforming men on college campuses.20
Among married couples, women are usually equally educated or more educated than
their husbands.21 In 2007, 53% of married couples reported having the same amount
of education.22 Of the couples with disparate education, 28% had a wife with more
education while 19% had a husband with more education.23 Even if a woman marries
a wealthy man, she is likely to continue to work and accumulate her own wealth. A
recent report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
describes the change this way:
In couple households, the wives of top earners were those whose
employment rates increased the most. There was also in all countries a rise in the
phenomenon known as “assortative mating”, that is to say people with higher
earnings having their spouses in the same earnings bracket – e.g. doctors marrying
doctors rather than nurses. Today, 40% of couples where both partners work belong
to the same or neighbouring earnings deciles compared with 33% some 20 years
ago.24
The assumption that women have a greater demand for marriage than men
is also incorrect and overly simplistic. Recent studies show that there is no major
gender divide in the desire to marry and that, on the whole, the marriage market is

17. Id. at 11–12.
18. Claudia Goldin et al., The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College
Gender Gap 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12139, 2006),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12139.pdf?new_window=1.
19. Id.
20. See Tamar Lewin, At Colleges, Women Are Leaving Men in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/education/09college.html?pagewanted=all.
21. PEW RESEARCH CTR., Women, Men and the New Economics of Marriage 1 (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Dan Beucke, The Income Gap Grows—As Does the Spouse Gap, BUS. WEEK (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/finance/occupy-wallstreet/archives/2011/12/why_the_income_gap_is_growing_worldwide.html.
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fairly balanced between the genders.25 Other factors do complicate the market.
Unmarried young women often look for men who are their peers in terms of
educational attainment.26 But, because women outpace men in college, the pool of
desirable men has shrunk.27 Similarly, young women tend to seek men who are
employed; but employment among young men has declined in recent years.28 The
market varies by geographical region as well—some areas have significantly more
“desirable” unmarried men than others.29 The Internet, however, makes up for some
of these geographical differences.30 As one study explains “[e]fficiencies of Internet
search are especially important for individuals searching for something
uncommon.”31 For example, gays and lesbians, who constitute a small overall
percentage of our population, “are nearly always in thin dating markets.”32
Consequently, that same study found that 60 percent of same-sex couples who had
met each other in recent years had done so online.33 This phenomenon applies to
heterosexual couples as well. Once heterosexual men and women reach middle age,
many potential mates are already coupled, making the overall dating pool quite
thin.34 The Internet allows those heterosexual singles to cast a wider net in order to
find a suitable mate.35
It seems clear that the assumption that women are categorically in a weaker
bargaining position at the outset of marriage is simply inaccurate. Although some
disparities may exist, spouses are increasingly starting from an even playing field.
Yet, the law continues to assume that spouses are not evenly matched and that the
weaker spouse needs significant protection. The time has come to move past this
view.
B.

Substance Assumptions: Assumptions Unsupported by Fact

The second assumption made by many critics is one of substance. Critics
often assume that the substance of most premarital agreements is one-sided and seeks
to opt out of the default marital rules without adequate consideration paid to the other
spouse.36 Yet, “[t]here seems to be no statistically valid empirical research that
systematically studies the characteristics of the men and women who make

25. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., Record Share of Americans Have Never Married: As Values,
Economics
and
Gender
Patterns
Change
(Sept.
24,
2014),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-Married-Americans.pdf.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Betty Wang, The Best and Worst Cities for Women Looking to Marry, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/the-best-and-worst-cities-for-womenlooking-to-marry/.
30. See Rosenfeld & Thomas, supra note 14, at 532.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 533.
33. Id. at 532.
34. See id. at 539, 544.
35. See id. at. 539–40.
36. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 366 (2005–2006); Brod, supra note 1, at 239.
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premarital agreements or the contents of the contracts themselves.”37 Those critics
who do offer support for their assumption point to anecdotal evidence, litigated
cases, and/or the contents of practice guides and other guidebooks.38 None of these
sources can provide an accurate picture of the content of the majority of premarital
agreements. Anecdotal evidence is unreliable, conflicting, and sometimes selfserving.39 Looking to cases is problematic because the substance of most premarital
agreements is rarely a question for the courts. It is only when the marriage ends in a
contested divorce or a contested estate that the courts would have occasion to
examine the substance of a premarital agreement.
The truth is that we really do not know what is contained in most premarital
agreements. No law mandates that agreements be one-sided. Parties are free to
arrange their property and financial affairs according to just about any set of rules
they deem appropriate. If, in fact, premarital agreements are predominantly onesided then that is a failure of the people responsible for drafting those agreements—
not the law itself.
C.

Default Laws: Better or Worse for Women than Contracts?

The assumption that women are adequately or better protected by default
marital property and alimony laws is misguided—at best. This assumption makes
about as much sense as assuming that your desires are better fulfilled by relying on
the laws of intestate succession than by preparing your own last will and testament.
This faulty belief is related to the assumption that most agreements are one-sided and
a related assumption that the default laws provide for fair and equitable outcomes for
the economically inferior spouse. Certainly, there are instances where the default
laws operate to the benefit of an individual woman—particularly when compared to
a one-sided agreement. These laws do not, however, benefit women (or economically
inferior spouses) as a class. Nor do they reliably produce fair and equitable outcomes.
Broadly, there are four sets of default rules aimed at protecting a spouse
from suffering the financial consequences of divorce or death of a spouse and at
providing a fair and equitable division of assets: alimony, equitable distribution,
community property, and elective share statutes. These laws suffer from a variety of
deficiencies. Alimony and equitable distribution awards are unpredictable and costly
to pursue. Some—like elective share statutes and certain aspects of community
property laws—are easily avoided even in the absence of a prenuptial agreement.

37. Brod, supra note 1, at 240; accord Guggenheimer, supra note 10, at 152–53.
38. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 1, at 239 (citing the observation of a single practitioner); Judith T.
Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 349, 420, n.739 (2007) (citing court decisions) [hereinafter Lovers’ Contracts];
Guggenheimer, supra note 10, at 160 (using guidebooks and practice guides as a proxy for the contents
of actual agreements); Rebecca Glass, Trading Up: Postnuptial Agreements, Fairness, and a Principled
New Suitor for California, 92 CAL. L. REV. 215, 218 (2004) (anecdotal evidence of financial disparity
between spouses); Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 832 (2007)
(anecdotal evidence of content of postnuptial agreements); Brian Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI
Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 231, 232 (2001) (anecdotal evidence and
reported cases used to extrapolate content and purpose of agreements).
39. See Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of
Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 811, n.373 (2004).
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Perhaps most importantly, none of the default laws offer financial protections to
spouses during an ongoing marriage or otherwise operate to treat the spouses fairly
during marriage.
1.

Alimony Awards

Alimony—which predates equitable distribution laws—is on shaky
theoretical footing today.40 As many scholars have observed, there is no single
coherent theory underpinning alimony and the outcomes are unpredictable.41 Also
referred to as a maintenance award or spousal support, alimony is essentially some
form of monetary award granted to a spouse at divorce. Most states set forth factors
to be considered by the court in making alimony awards—including need of the
spouse, length of the marriage, and childcare responsibilities.42 Because alimony is
only awarded at divorce, it does nothing to improve the economic position of a
spouse during marriage.
The enforceability of premarital waivers or modifications of alimony
awards varies somewhat by state.43 Most states agree that premarital waivers of postdivorce alimony are generally enforceable.44 However, a number of states also agree
that premarital waivers of interim alimony are unenforceable because of the support
obligations spouses owe each other during an ongoing marriage.45 To the extent that
women do waive or modify alimony rights in premarital agreements, critics argue
that such waivers or modifications are harmful.46 In doing so, critics argue, women
forfeit the ability to recoup their lost income and earning potential when they decide
to leave the workforce or make other career sacrifices to care for children.47 This
argument is based in part on a content-based assumption (that alimony rights are
waived or modified in a one-sided manner) for which, as discussed above, we have
no evidence. But, even if that assumption is correct, waiving alimony rights is more
likely to save a woman from expensive, speculative, and demoralizing litigation than
it is to cause her some actual harm. The truth is that alimony rarely compensates
women adequately for their losses. 48 Alimony awards are uncommon and, when
they are made, are often limited to short time frames.49 Alimony awards are
notoriously unpredictable—reducing incentives to amicably settle disputes and
40. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Cynthia Lee
Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L. Q. 271 (2011); John C. Sheldon & Nancy Diesel Mills, In Search of
a Theory of Alimony, 45 ME. L. REV. 283 (1993).
41. Starnes, supra note 40, at 271.
42. See Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI
Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 129 (2001) .
43. See Susan Wolfson, Premarital Waiver of Alimony, 38 FAM. L.Q. 141, 144–52 (2004).
44. See Jonathan E. Fields, Forbidden Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements: Legal and Practical
Considerations for the Matrimonial Lawyer, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 413, 423 (2008).
45. Id.
46. See Lovers’ Contracts, supra note 38, at 422. See also Brod, supra note 1, at 234–35.
47. See Lovers’ Contracts, supra note 38, at 421–22. See also Brod, supra note 1, at 234–35.
48. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 127–32 (2008); Mark A. Sessums, What Are
Wives’ Contributions Worth Upon Divorce? Toward a Fully Incorporating Partnership into Equitable
Distribution, 41 FLA. L. REV. 987, 995–1000 (1989).
49. See McMullen, supra note 3, at 45–50 (2011).
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increasing costs of divorce.50 Many states continue to tie alimony awards to marital
fault, which further increases costs, lack of predictability, and demoralizing
litigation.51 This approach “incentivizes parties facing separation to keep a score card
of poor behavior, vet out details of indiscretions, and further swells the already
amplified wave of emotions that parties to a divorce are experiencing.”52 Alimony
also carries a societal stigma to the women who seek it, often harming them and
preventing some women from seeking it in the first place.53
An economically inferior spouse can be much better protected by a
premarital agreement that clearly delineates what property or award that spouse
should be entitled to at divorce. Contemplating an alimony award in a premarital
agreement can decrease costs, increase predictability, and obviate the need for
stigmatizing and demoralizing litigation.
2.

Equitable Distribution

Like alimony, equitable distribution is a legal protection that operates in the
divorce setting. At divorce, equitable distribution laws direct the court to divide the
couple’s property equitably, without regard to legal title.54 All of the non-community
property states employ some method of equitable distribution, as do some of the
community property states.55 Exactly what constitutes an “equitable” distribution
depends very much on the state and the judge, who is afforded a great deal of
discretion.56 Broadly, there are two types of equitable distribution systems—the allproperty system and the dual classification system.57 The choice of system affects
which assets will be subject to division at divorce.58 In an all-property jurisdiction
the court has jurisdiction over all of the property of both spouses—regardless of the
time or manner of its acquisition.59 In dual classification systems—the more common
of the two—the court must first classify property as either separate or marital. Only
marital property is subject to division.60 Marital property typically includes property
that results from the labor or industry of the spouses during marriage.61 Separate

50. See, e.g., Twila B. Larkin, Guidelines for Alimony: The New Mexico Experiment, 38 FAM. L.Q.
29, 29 (2004); David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important Policy in Need of a Coherent Policy
Purpose, 9 NEV. L.J. 325, 325 (2009).
51. See Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues With No-Fault Divorce, 17
REGENT U.L. REV. 243, 248–49 (2004–2005).
52. Meghan L. Kruger, Separation Anxiety: The Implications of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to
Remove Fault from Divorce Proceedings, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 808, 834 (2014).
53. See McMullen, supra note 3, at 45–50.
54. See BRETT R. TURNER, 1 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1:1 (3rd ed. 2005).
55. See Marsha Garrison, What’s Fair in Divorce Property Distribution: Cross-National
Perspectives from Survey Evidence, 72 LA. L. REV. 57, 68–69 (2011).
56. Id. at 58.
57. See TURNER, supra note 54, at §§ 2.7–2.9.
58. See id. at § 2.7.
59. See id. at § 2:8.
60. See id. at § 2:9.
61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075 (West 2016) (marital assets includes “assets acquired . . .
during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121
(West 2016) (marital property includes property “acquired by either or both spouses during the course of
the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing”).
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property generally consists of premarital property and property acquired by gift or
inheritance.62 Significant variations exist from state-to-state—what is fair and
equitable in North Carolina may be unfair and inequitable in South Carolina.
As is the case with alimony, critics of premarital agreements often make the
content-based argument that the terms of a premarital agreement will operate to the
detriment of the disadvantaged spouse. According to Professor Brod, “mutual
waiver[s] of state law protections” are necessarily harmful to the economically
inferior spouse.63 She also contends, that “even if the weaker spouse is given some
settlement in return for the waiver, this remuneration is not likely to equal or exceed
the economic protection provided by state law.”64 Not only are these sweeping
assumptions unsupported by any reliable evidence, what evidence does exist
indicates the opposite may be the case.
In some instances the default law clearly favors the economically superior
spouse. For example, most dual-classification jurisdictions agree that inheritances,
gifts, and premarital assets are separate property—an approach generally benefitting
the wealthier spouse.65 Considerable variation exists, however, with respect to the
classification of increases in value to separate property and income derived from
separate property.66 Laws that classify such assets as separate property typically
operate to the detriment of the economically inferior spouse by removing assets from
the pool of marital assets available for division. Disability benefits, personal injury
awards, professional degrees, life insurance, and goodwill in a professional business
can cause similar problems. They are marital property subject to division in some
states, but not others.67 Separate assets “are the very types of assets that place one
spouse in a substantially more economically advantaged condition than the other
spouse.”68 To the extent that the default laws classify property as separate property
belonging to the economically superior spouse or otherwise make an asset
unavailable for division they necessarily operate to the disadvantage of the other
spouse.
Judicial discretion may also favor the economically superior spouse. Courts
in many equitable distribution states are expressly directed to consider the
62. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 (West 2015) (non-marital property includes “[p]roperty
acquired prior to marriage or by gift or by reason of the death of another” and
“[p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075
(West 2016) (Non-marital assets include “assets acquired . . . by either party prior to the marriage . . . “
and “assets acquired separated by either party by non-interspousal gift, bequest, devise or descent. . . . “).
63. Brod, supra note 1, at 234–35.
64. Id.
65. See Paul Tomar, Division of Property in Hawaii: Does the Law Unduly Favor the Economically
Advantaged Spouse?, 14 HAW. B.J. 4, 9 (2010).
66. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 (West 2015) (income and increase in value to non-marital
property is likewise non-marital property); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-20 (West 2015) (“The increase in
value of separate property and the income derived from separate property shall be considered separate
property.”). But see In re Foottit, 903 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Colo. App. 1995) (holding that income received
from separate property is marital property); Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 854 (Minn. 2003)
(holding that income from non-marital assets is a marital asset).
67. TURNER, supra note 54, at § 6:52–88; see Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership
Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 168–71 (2004).
68. Tomar, supra note 65, at 10.
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contributions made by each spouse to the marital property in order to determine what
division is equitable.69 An empirical study by Professor Garrison supports the theory
that judges weigh this factor heavily in dividing marital property, to the detriment of
the economically inferior spouse.70
Lack of predictability in equitable distribution cases further undermines
many criticisms of premarital agreements. Equitable distribution cases are
notoriously unpredictable.71 In pursuit of a personalized approach to asset division—
equitable distribution grants trial judges an incredible amount of discretion. That
personalized approach, however, often harms the economically inferior spouse.72
Lack of predictability, for example, reduces incentives to settle disputes—resulting
in time-consuming and expensive divorce proceedings.73 These costs can
significantly deplete the amount of property ultimately available for division
between the spouses—an outcome obviously harmful to the poorer or less
employable spouse.74 In deciding how to distribute assets, many states allow courts
to consider marital fault in dividing marital property—which causes the same
problems seen in the alimony context.75 Unpredictability and reliance on judicial
discretion may also further weaken the bargaining position of an already
disadvantaged spouse.76 Both predictability and freedom from judicial discretion can
be readily accomplished in a premarital agreement.
3.

Elective Share Statutes.

Elective share statutes generally operate to prevent a spouse from being
completely disinherited upon the death of the other spouse. The nature of the elective
share varies significantly depending on the jurisdiction.77 Most community property
states offer no elective share protection—relying instead on the community property
laws.78 Among those states that do offer elective share protections, states vary
69. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075 (West 2016) (allowing consideration of “[t]he contribution of
each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement, and production of income or the improvement of . . . both
the marital assets and the nonmarital assets of the parties”); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502
(West 2016) (allowing consideration of “[t]he contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property . . . “); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-103
(West 2016) (allowing consideration of “[t]he extent to which each party has contributed to the
acquisition, preservation and maintenance or increase in value of marital property by monetary
contributions . . . “).
70. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases: An Empirical Analysis of
Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 456–57 (1996).
71. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What’s Needed and What’s Not, 27 PACE L. REV.
921, 925 (2007); Kelly, supra note 67, at 167.
72. See Garrison, Reforming Divorce, supra note 71, at 928.
73. E.g., Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 730 (1991); Kreuger, supra note 52, at
832.
74. E.g., Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 73, at 730; Krueger, supra note 52, at
834.
75. See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 54, at § 8:24; Kreuger, supra note 52, at 826–28.
76. Reforming Divorce, supra note 71, at 928.
77. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Community Property v. the Elective Share, 72 LA. L. REV. 161, 163
(2011).
78. See id.
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“widely in the amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled, the variables that
determine the amount (length of marriage, family situation, surviving spouse’s net
worth, etc.), and the property that is subject to the elective share.” Not only are
elective share statutes highly variable, they are also easily avoided through the use
of trusts, inter vivos gifting, life insurance, and other common estate planning
techniques.79 Even if a spouse is financially insecure, a waiver of elective share rights
might actually operate to his or her benefit. Waiving such rights well in advance may
better enable a surviving spouse to qualify for Medicaid or similar needs-based
benefits at a later date.80 Moreover, better protection from disinheritance can be
accomplished in a premarital agreement that expressly contemplates provision for
the surviving spouse.
4.

Community Property.

Community property laws offer rights at both death and divorce, and to a
lesser extent during marriage. Each spouse in a community property regime is
deemed to be the owner of one-half of all of the couple’s community property—
which generally includes property acquired by the effort, labor, or industry of the
spouses during marriage.81 Separate property—which typically includes premarital
property, inheritances, and gifts—is owned by each spouse, individually.82 Each
spouse can only dispose of one-half of the community property at death—a rule that
provides some measure of protection to the surviving spouse against disinheritance.83
Divorce is a more complicated matter. Three community property states—Louisiana,
California, and New Mexico—employ the rule of equal division at divorce.84 In an
equal division system each spouse retains all of his or her separate property as well
as one-half of the community property.85 Unlike equitable distribution, the judge
does not typically have the authority to provide for some other allocation of assets if
he deems the default rule inequitable. The other community property jurisdictions,
however, have adopted an equitable distribution approach at divorce that operates
much like any other dual classification state.86
Community property offers one benefit to the economically inferior spouse
that is not afforded under any other system. Under the community property laws of
every community property state except Texas, the spouses purportedly have co-equal
rights to the management of the community property during marriage.87 In theory
79. See generally Turnipseed, supra note 77, at 178–80.
80. See, e.g., EDWIN KASSOFF, ELDER LAW AND GUARDIANSHIP IN NEW YORK § 7:147 (2014);
VINCENT J. RUSSO & MARVIN RACHLIN, NEW YORK ELDER LAW AND SPECIAL NEEDS PRACTICE § 22:24
(2015).
81. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 2016); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2336, 2338 (2015).
82. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (2015).
83. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 2016); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.(1), (2) (2015);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.02.070 (West 2015).
84. James R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions: Equitable
Doesn’t Equal Equal, 72 LA. L. REV. 21, 21 (2011); accord CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2015); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.(1), (2) (2015).
85. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2015); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.(1), (2) (2015).
86. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West 2015).
See generally Ratner, supra note 84.
87. See Carter, supra note 6, at 873–74.
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then, spouses in community property regimes do not have to wait until death or
divorce to be on equal economic footing with each other. As I have argued elsewhere,
however, the notion of co-equal rights during marriage is more theory than reality.88
In truth, there are so many exceptions to the rule of equal management that the rule
is practically worthless—rarely, if ever, providing spouses with equal decision
making over their community assets.89
Community property rules offer few, if any, clear advantages at divorce.
Those community property states that employ equitable distribution at divorce suffer
the same shortcomings discussed above. Equal division states may offer advantages
in some instances,90 but they are just as likely to benefit the economically superior
spouse or to result in outcomes that are patently unfair.91 As in dual classification
jurisdictions, many community property rules operate to the advantage of the
economically superior spouse. Five of the community property states, for example,
classify the rents and profits earned from separate property as separate property.92
As discussed above, this approach—the so called “American rule”—tends to favor
the economically superior spouse. The other four community property states adhere
to the Spanish rule that classifies such property as community.93 Two of those states,
however, allow a spouse to elect American Rule treatment in some instances without
the necessity of the other spouse’s agreement.94
Community property laws can also have harmful and unanticipated
financial consequences during an intact marriage—consequences easily avoided by
premarital agreement. The default community property regime, for example, can be
disastrous for spouses who are unable to pay their bills.95 Bankruptcy is similarly
problematic because the financial irresponsibility of one spouse may result in both

88. See id. at 870–88.
89. Id.
90. See Ratner, supra note 84, at 35–42 (arguing that “an equal division of community worth is
preferable” to judicial discretion to make an equitable distribution).
91. See generally Ashley L. Gill, Comment, Until Debt Do Us Part: The Need for Revision of Article
2364 Reimbursement Claims for Student Loan Debts, 74 LA. L. REV. 1007, 1026 (2014) (stating that equal
division states have distribution statutes that are not equitable in distributing debt based on enjoyment or
benefits received). But see Kelly Kromer Boudreaux, Comment, So You’ve Married a Mismanager: The
Inadequacy of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2354, 68 LA. L. REV. 219, 223 (2007) (“Community property
states thus recognize that different, but valuable, contributions are made to the marriage by both the
working and non-working spouse.”).
92. See Thomas R. Andrews, Income from Separate Property: Towards a Theoretical Foundation,
56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 180–92 (1993) (stating that Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Washington classify separate property rent and interest earned as separate property); see also Wendy
A. Wake, Note, Uniform Marital Property Act: Suggested Revisions for Equality Between Spouses, 1987
U. ILL. L. REV. 471, 480 (1987) (stating that Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington
follow the American Rule).
93. Andrews, supra note 92, at 180 (stating that Idaho, Louisiana, Wisconsin, and Texas follow the
Spanish rule).
94. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (West 2003).
95. See, e.g., James R. Ratner, Creditor and Debtor Windfalls from Divorce, 3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY.
PROP. L.J. 211, 215–22 (2011) (explaining that spouses are at risk because of the debts incurred during
marriage); Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stepień-Sporek, To Have and To Hold, For Richer or Richer:
Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27, 32 (2009) (stating that both
spouses are at risk of having their property collected to pay off the other spouse’s debt).
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spouses being called into bankruptcy court.96 Community property limits the right of
a spouse to seek innocent spouse relief under the Internal Revenue Code—even if
the spouses filed separate income tax returns.97
Community property may be based on a theory of sharing and partnership
that is consistent with modern marriage—but this theory rarely translates into
reality.98 In some instances the default community property laws operate to the
detriment of the spouses as a single economic unit or to the detriment of the
financially insecure spouse. These pitfalls can be easily avoided through a
personalized premarital agreement.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY: UNHELPFUL BARRIER TO FREE
CONTRACT
Freedom of contract is a fundamental organizing principal of most western
legal systems and is essential to a free society.99 That freedom of contract is an
essential feature of American law is hardly surprising; it is consistent with the high
value Americans have always placed on personal autonomy.100 Yet, common law has
largely resisted a robust freedom of contract policy in the marriage context. The more
barriers we erect to entering into premarital contracts, the more expensive and
stigmatized they become and the less likely prospective spouses are to consider
entering into them.
Freedom of contract is subject to a variety of restrictions—such as the
requirement of the free consent of the parties to the contract.101 Although these
limitations exist in all areas of contract law, they tend to present more substantial
barriers in the premarital agreement context. As one American court recently
explained: “in many instances agreements addressing matrimonial issues have been
subjected to limitations and scrutiny beyond that afforded contracts in general.”102
Common law’s “traditional societal distrust”103 for premarital agreements stemmed,

96. See generally Margaret Dee McGarity, Community Property in Bankruptcy: Laws of Unintended
Consequences, 72 LA. L. REV. 143 (2011).
97. See BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS ¶ 35.1[2] (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2d ed. 1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in United
States v. Mitchell that a community property wife was liable for the taxes on her share of her husband’s
earnings for years in which no returns were filed by him, although she had little knowledge of his finances
and relied on his assurances that he was filing timely returns and paying the taxes due.”).
98. See generally Carter, supra note 6.
99. Stickovich v. City of Cleveland, 143 Ohio App. 3d 13, 2001-Ohio-4117, 757 N.E.2d 50, at ¶ 20
(“In a free and democratic society, freedom of contract is the general rule; public-policy limits are the
exception.”); accord Christina Erbel-Borges & Su Yingxia, Freedom of Contract in Modern Chinese
Legal Practice, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 341, 341 (2014); Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova,
Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market Adaptations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 105 (2008); Bruno
Zeller, When is a Fixed Sum Not a Fixed Sum But a Penalty Clause?, 30 J.L. & COM. 173, 175 (2012).
100. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 193
(2012); Karen A. Cerulo, Social Relations, Core Values, and the Polyphony of the American Experience,
23 SOC. F. 351, 352 (2008).
101. E.g., Morrill v. Nightingale, 28 P. 1068, 1069 (Cal. 1892) (“The consent of a party to a contract
must be free, and it is not free when obtained through duress or menace.”).
102. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 999 N.Y.S.2d 386, 386 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
103. Estate of Martin, 2008 ME 7, 938 A.2d 812, 817.
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primarily, from a paternalistic view towards women and concerns regarding divorce.
104
Common law often stigmatized the marriage contract and subjected it to a stricter
scrutiny than other types of contracts.105 Many common law jurisdictions accepted
and enforced marriage contracts regulating the distribution of property upon the
death of a spouse—and particularly contracts that waived one spouse’s rights in the
estate of the other spouse.106 In the case of second marriages, for example, these
contracts presumably facilitated marital harmony by “allow[ing] the marriage to
occur without disturbing third-party rights.”107 In other words, common law had few
qualms with allowing a surviving spouse to sign an agreement that prohibited her
from having any rights in her deceased spouse’s estate. However, common law
jurisdictions treated marriage contracts regulating the relationship between the
spouses or division of property at divorce with overt hostility.108 Most states lacked
statutes specifically addressing marriage contracts that were effective at some time
earlier than the death of a spouse.109 Moreover, many courts believed these types of
marriage contracts violated public policy by encouraging divorce.110 Divorcefocused agreements were “antithetical to the marriage contract” and any “contracts
which tend to induce a separation of husband and wife [were] utterly void and of no
force or effect.”111
As views of marriage, divorce, and family changed, marriage contracts
gained greater acceptance. Yet, significant barriers still exist. Common law claims
to have now rejected the “paternalistic presumptions and protections that arose to
shelter women from the inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as
having in earlier times.”112 These paternalistic presumptions, however, are far from
gone.
A.

Unconscionability in General

Free consent of the parties is an essential element of a valid contract. When
consent is not free—such as when it is the result of duress, error/mistake, or fraud—
then the contract is generally voidable.113 In allowing the aggrieved party to avoid a
contract the law recognizes that there was no meeting of the minds on the part of the

104. Id.
105. See James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 937–38 (2000) (stating that
prenuptial agreements were historically disfavored and condemned); see also Note, Marriage, Contracts,
and Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1941) (stating that marriage is highly favored, and that contracts
that discourage marriage raise public policy concerns).
106. See William F. Fraatz, Comment, Enforcing Antenuptial Contracts in Minnesota: A Practice in
Search of a Policy Basis in the Wake of McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 77 MINN. L. REV. 441, 444 (1992)
(observing that marital contracts were enforced as economic regulators at the death of a spouse).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 445–46 (stating that divorce-focused agreements were highly disfavored).
109. See Dennis I. Belcher & Laura O. Pomeroy, A Practitioner’s Guide for Negotiating, Drafting and
Enforcing Premarital Agreements, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 4 (2002) (stating that states made
determinations on a case-by-case basis in absence of premarital statutes).
110. See Fraatz, supra note 107, at 445
111. See id.
112. Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 544, 556 (Conn. 2007) (citations omitted).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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aggrieved party and, therefore, a fundamental element of contract formation does not
exist.114 These exact same rules supposedly apply to the enforceability of premarital
agreements. In addition to duress, error/mistake, and fraud, common law recognizes
an additional consent-based ground for rendering a contract voidable—
unconscionability.115 The doctrine of unconscionability allows a court to refuse to
enforce contracts, or specific contractual provisions, that are so “one-sided,
oppressive and unfairly surprising” that no reasonable person would have agreed to
be bound by such terms.116 A contract may be either procedurally or substantively
unconscionable—but both bear on issues of consent.117 A contract “[i]n the
commercial context [a contract is] unconscionable at law if it is such as no man in
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other.”118 Yet, the mere fact that an agreement might
be more favorable to one party than the other should not, alone, render it
unenforceable.119 If a party has entered into a disadvantageous contract despite being
fully apprised of all the facts, he should be bound by that contract.120
The doctrine of unconscionability has been expressly adopted in the
matrimonial agreement context by most American states.121 While unconscionability
might serve some useful role in the law governing matrimonial agreements, it does
not currently do so. Rather, unconscionability, as currently implemented in the
matrimonial agreements context, is unhelpful, unduly paternalistic, and serves
primarily to increase barriers to entering into premarital agreements.
The tests for unconscionability in the premarital agreement context reflect
the underlying assumption that parties are in unequal bargaining positions. Whether
a premarital agreement will deemed unconscionable typically turns on either of two
factors: (1) whether the parties made adequate financial disclosures to each other;
and (2) whether the parties consulted with independent counsel.122 Both factors—
which, in practice, often serve as proxies for determining unconscionability—are
drawn from the divorce context.123 In particular, these factors are drawn from a view
of marriage and divorce that prevailed during the 1970’s—views that have little to
do with the realities of contemporary marriages. Couples today rarely marry in order
to achieve financial stability—rather, they have usually achieved that stability prior
to marrying.124 Financial instability, however, remains an important predictor of

114. E.g., Foster v. Auto-Owners Ins., Co., 703 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Ind. 1998); Metro. State Bank v.
Cox, 134 Colo. 260, ¶¶ 2–6, 302 P.2d 188 (1956).
115. SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §18.1 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2010).
116. Energy Home v. Peay, 406 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Ky. 2013); accord Markwed Excavating, Inc. v.
Mandan, 2010 ND 220, ¶ 22, 791 N.W.2d 22.
117. Id. at 835.
118. In re Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Iowa 2008).
119. E.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362, 1365–66 (Haw. 1988) (stating that a mere inequitable
contract does not render it unenforceable unless it rises to the level of unconscionability).
120. Id.
121. See infra Section III(B).
122. E.g., Younger, supra note 9, at 1062.
123. See infra Section III(B)(4).
124. See supra Part II.
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divorce.125 Divorce—which necessarily involves litigation—seems to be a poor
model upon which to base premarital agreement laws. Agreements entered into in
connection with divorce are “negotiated under conditions of extraordinary stress”
and are “uniquely positioned to exploit psychological and emotional dependencies
built up over a number of years.”126 Couples entering into marriage, however, stand
in a much different position.
B.

Full Financial Disclosure—A Useless Proxy for Unconscionability

Many jurisdictions have adopted the view that a full disclosure of each
party’s assets and liabilities prior to the execution of a premarital agreement serves
as proxy for assuring the agreement is not unconscionable. This approach—
borrowed from divorce cases and laws—is problematic for several reasons. As
explained below, the significance of financial disclosure to the ultimate
enforceability of the agreement varies somewhat by jurisdiction. Regardless of
whether a jurisdiction views financial disclosure as an absolute requirement for a
valid premarital agreement, lawyers will require clients to make such disclosures as
a matter of course—thus increasing transaction costs and barriers to entry.127 The
authors of a Florida practice guide, for example, point out that although “financial
disclosure is not required under the UPAA or the Florida Probate Code for premarital
agreements”; it nonetheless “appears that it is always best practice to provide full
financial disclosure which discloses assets, liabilities, and income.”128
1.

UPAA States

The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (the “UPAA”)—which has been
adopted by at least twenty-six American jurisdictions129—clearly uses financial
disclosure as a sort of proxy for unconscionability. Unconscionability alone does not
render the agreement voidable under the UPAA; rather, a party must show that “the
agreement was unconscionable when it was executed” and that prior to execution:
(1) the party “was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party;” (2) the party “did not voluntarily and
125. See Carter, supra note 6.
126. Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on
Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1406 (1984).
127. E.g., THOMAS A. JACOBS, ARIZONA PRACTICE SERIES, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 2.10,
Westlaw (database updated September 2015); ABRAHAM M. MORA ET AL., 12 FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES,
ESTATE PLANNING §§ 25:14, 20, Westlaw (database updated December 2015); 12 ILLINOIS FORMS LEGAL
& BUSINESS §§ 36:2, 5, Westlaw (database updated August 2015); LINDA D. ELROND & JAMES P.
BUCHELE, 1 KANSAS LAW AND PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW § 2:16, Westlaw (database updated December
2015); LLOYD T. KELSO, 1 NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 3.8, Westlaw (database updated
July 2015); DORIS J. LICHT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING IN RHODE ISLAND § 12.3.1
(2011); 15 TEXAS FORMS LEGAL AND BUSINESS §§ 32:7-8, Westlaw (database updated August 2015).
128. ABRAHAM M. MORA ET AL., 12 FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES § 25:20 Westlaw (database updated
December 2015); accord PHILLIP C. HUNT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING IN MAINE § 12.3.1
(1st ed. 2012) (“Note that although technically financial disclosure is optional . . . it is highly
recommended that the parties provide such information.”).
129. See Legislative Fact Sheet – Premarital Agreement Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Premarital%20Agreement%20Act.
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2016).
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expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and” (3) the party “did
not have, or reasonably could not have had an adequate knowledge of the property
or financial obligations of the other party.”130
The UPPA approach has created some rather curious outcomes in the
courts. The UPAA prohibits a finding of unconscionability if a party made adequate
financial disclosure.131 In Marscocci v. Marsocci, for example, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court specifically found a prenuptial agreement to be unconscionable
because the wife was not represented by an attorney and the agreement was one sided
in favor of the husband.132 Despite the agreement’s unconscionability, the court
upheld the agreement because the husband made an adequate financial disclosure in
accordance with the statute.133 As the court explained, “[u]nconscionability alone . . .
will not defeat a premarital agreement.”134 Notice that the reasons the agreement was
unconscionable—lack of counsel and one-sidedness—really had little to do with
financial disclosure. Financial disclosure, or waiver of such disclosure, would not
have done anything to remedy the unfairness of the agreement. Despite the
limitations of the UPAA financial disclosure requirements, courts in UPAA states
can readily refuse to enforce premarital agreements that they disagree with by finding
that they were not executed voluntarily.135
2.

Modified UPAA States

Not all states adopted the UPAA as written—a number modified the Act in
ways that make financial disclosure even more important. Connecticut and Iowa, for
example, make lack of financial disclosure an independent ground for voiding a
premarital agreement.136 In those states, a matrimonial agreement may be
unenforceable if it is either unconscionable or if there was an insufficient financial
disclosure or waiver of such disclosure.137 Nevada and North Dakota take fairly
similar approaches.138 In all of these states the mere lack of financial disclosure or
an adequate waiver may be sufficient to invalidate an otherwise fairly negotiated
contract. This result seems extreme. In the absence of a premarital agreement, a
spouse’s financial situation prior to marriage may have little or no bearing upon the
division of assets upon the termination of the marriage. Why, then, should the
enforceability of a premarital agreement be predicated on such a disclosure?

130. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
131. See, e.g., Mamot v. Mamot, 813 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Neb. 2012); In re Marriage of Rudder, 217
P.3d 183, 189–90 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
132. 911 A.2d 690, 698 (R.I. 2006).
133. Id. at 699.
134. Id. at 698.
135. See, e.g., Mamot v. Mamot, 813 N.W.2d 440 (Neb. 2012).
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-36(g) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.8 (West 2016).
137. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-36(g) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.8 (West 2016).
138. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03.2-08 (West
2016).
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Non-UPAA States

Even those states that have not adopted the UPAA use financial disclosure
as a sort of proxy for assessing unconscionability. Georgia, for example, considers
three factors in order to determine whether a premarital agreement is valid: “(1) Was
the agreement obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or through
misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement
unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement
was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?”139 In applying
this test, Georgia courts use misrepresentation or nondisclosure of financial
information as a proxy for determining the second factor—unconscionability.140 The
mere fact that the agreement is grossly inequitable is not grounds for
unconscionability if there was an adequate disclosure of financial resources. As one
court explained: “That the antenuptial agreement may have perpetuated the already
existing disparity between the parties’ estates does not in and of itself render the
agreement unconscionable when . . . there was full and fair disclosure of the assets
of the parties prior to the execution of the agreement . . . “141 On the other hand,
failure to make an adequate financial disclosure will typically render the agreement
unenforceable.142
4. What is the Point of Full Financial Disclosure?
Prospective spouses should, of course, have open and frank discussions
with each other about their financial resources and liabilities. The ability and
willingness of spouses to have those types of conversations is an important predictor
of successful marriages.143 Yet, we require no such inquiry when spouses marry
without a premarital agreement. Moreover, the types of disclosures required in
connection with premarital agreements does not necessarily facilitate open an honest
discussion. So, why is this disclosure required? A spouse’s premarital assets are not
typically subject to division at divorce, nor are those assets necessarily indicative of
the assets and liabilities a spouse will have at death or divorce.144 A spouse will
typically not have any rights to the other spouse’s premarital assets during
marriage.145 It seems odd that the enforceability of a contract should be predicated
on the disclosure of facts that may have little relevance at death, divorce, or even
during the marriage.
As it turns out, this illogical and sometimes burdensome requirement was
simply imported from Section 306 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (the
“UMDA”)—a model law that addressed a substantially different sort of
agreement.146 The requirement of financial disclosure makes more sense in context

139. Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. 2005); accord Blige v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822, 824
(Ga. 2008); Adams v. Adams, 603 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. 2004).
140. See Mallen, 622 S.E.2d at 816–17.
141. Adams, 603 S.E.2d at 275; accord Sides v. Sides, 717 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. 2011).
142. See Blige, 656 S.E.2d at 826.
143. See Carter, supra note 6, at 855–60.
144. See infra Section II(C)
145. See id.
146. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, CMT. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
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of the UMDA. “In order to promote amicable settlement of disputes” between
divorcing couples, Section 306 allows divorcing spouses to “enter into a written
agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property owned by either of
them, maintenance of either of them, and support, custody, and visitation of their
children.” Knowledge of assets owned by the spouses at the time of divorce is a
relevant consideration in awarding alimony and making an equitable or equal
division of marital property. Requiring fair disclosure by both spouses is appropriate
in this context because divorcing spouses have incentives to hide assets. Further, if
spouses are to enter into their own separation agreements it is important that they be
able to assess whether the agreement is fair—and the assets owned by each spouse
is an important factor in that assessment. But, disclosure of premarital assets makes
little sense as a requirement for valid premarital agreements.
C.

Independent Legal Representation

Most jurisdictions either require or strongly emphasize the need for access
to separate representation in the negotiation and execution of premarital agreements.
Imposing a “per se requirement that parties entering a [marriage] agreement must
obtain independent legal counsel [is] contrary to the traditional principles of contract
law . . . .”147 Yet, many states have effectively taken that approach. Although most
states fall short of an outright per se requirement of independent representation, they
nonetheless consider it an important—and often determinative—factor in the validity
of the agreement. This approach is overly paternalistic and, perhaps worse, fails to
achieve the goal it seeks to achieve.
1.

UPAA States

The UPAA does not expressly require independent legal representation.
Rather, Section 6 of the UPAA provides that an agreement is not enforceable if a
party shows his execution was not voluntary or that the agreement was
unconscionable when it was executed. As explained above, the test for
conscionability is expressly predicated on full financial disclosure. The comments to
Section 6, however, explain that although “the absence of independent legal counsel
[is not] a condition for the unenforceability of a premarital agreement;” the “lack of
that assistance may well be a factor in determining whether the conditions stated in
Section 6 may have existed.”148 This apparently stems from a belief that lack of
independent representation can create some “doubts regarding the good faith and
fairness aspect of the agreement.”149
Although this requirement is not express in the UPAA, it is clear that
adopting states require separate representation as a matter of course. In North
Dakota—a UPAA state where the statutes are silent on the issue of independent
representation—the state supreme court explained that “[w]e agree with the view
that lack of adequate legal advice to a prospective spouse to obtain independent
counsel is a significant factual factor in weighing the voluntariness of a premarital

147. Sabad v. Fessenden, 2003 PA Super 202, ¶ 16, 825 A.2d 682, 691.
148. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, CMT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
149. 12 ILLINOIS FORMS LEGAL & BUSINESS § 36:2 Westlaw (database updated August 2015).
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agreement.”150 Practice guides in nearly all of the adopting states recommend that
each party have independent legal representation and that steps are taken to assure
that none of the three conjunctive predicates for a finding of unconscionability are
an issue.151 An Illinois formulary, for example, offers this practice tip: “Although the
parties to a premarital agreement are not required to have the services of independent
counsel, it is highly recommended that they retain such services . . . “152
2.

Modified UPAA States and UPMAA States

Some UPAA states modified the act to essentially mandate separate
representation—an approach since adopted by the subsequent Uniform Premarital
and Marital Agreements Act (the “UPMAA”). Section 9 of the UPMAA—now
enacted in Colorado and North Dakota—makes it clear that an “agreement is
unenforceable if a party against whom enforcement is sought proves . . . .the party
did not have access to independent legal representation.”153 This change is supposed
to reflect the view of most states that “representation by independent counsel is
crucial for a party waiving important legal acts.”154 Connecticut—a UPAA state—
takes a similar approach by providing that an agreement is not enforceable against a
party who “was not afforded a reasonable opportunity consult with independent
counsel.”155 New Jersey provides that an agreement may be unconscionable if
(among other reasons) a party “did not consult with independent legal counsel and
did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, the opportunity to consult with
independent legal counsel.”156 California requires independent legal counsel or
adequate waiver for an agreement to be considered entered into voluntarily.157
Further, California requires that a party have “not less than seven calendar days
between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to
seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.”158

150. In re Estate of Lutz, 1997 ND 82, ¶ 34, 563 N.W.2d 90, 98.
151. See THOMAS A. JACOBS, ARIZONA PRACTICE SERIES, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 2.10,
Westlaw (database updated September 2015); ABRAHAM M. MORA ET AL., 12 FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES,
ESTATE PLANNING §§ 25:14, 20, Westlaw (database updated December 2015); 12 ILLINOIS FORMS LEGAL
& BUSINESS §§ 36.2, 5, Westlaw (database updated August 2015); LINDA D. ELROND & JAMES P.
BUCHELE, 1 KANSAS LAW AND PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW § 2:16, Westlaw (database updated December
2015); LLOYD T. KELSO, 1 NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 3.8, Westlaw (database updated
July 2015); DORIS J. LICHT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING IN RHODE ISLAND § 12.3.1
(2011); 15 TEXAS FORMS LEGAL AND BUSINESS §§ 32:7–8, Westlaw (database updated August 2015).
152. 12 ILLINOIS FORMS LEGAL & BUSINESS § 36.2, Westlaw (database updated August 2015); accord
J. ERIC SMITHBURN, 14 INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES § 2:6, Westlaw (database updated November 2015)
(“Parties entering into an antenuptial agreement should negotiate the terms well in advance of their
wedding day, and they should both be represented by counsel.”).
153. UNIFORM PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
154. Id. at CMT.
155. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-36(g) (West 2016).
156. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-38 (West 2015).
157. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 2016).
158. Id.
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Non-UPAA States

Even in states that have not adopted the UPAA, independent representation
remains an important consideration. Some states have created jurisprudential rules
essentially requiring access to independent legal representation.159 Other states use
the presence or absence of independent legal counsel as a sort of proxy for
determining unconscionability and, sometimes, voluntariness. In Fletcher v.
Fletcher, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that although “an
agreement signed without counsel is not per se invalid” whether a party had a
meaningful opportunity “to seek counsel before executing an antenuptial agreement
is . . . a significant element of the [] test to determine whether coercion or
overreaching occurred.”160 As a result, knowledgeable attorneys will insist that
spouses obtain independent legal representation even if there is no statutory
requirement that they do so.
4.

Why Do We Care About Separate Representation?

Spouses are free to marry and to subject themselves to the default marital
property laws without first consulting legal counsel. Why, then, do we want them to
seek not one, but two attorneys before they can enter into a premarital agreement
altering those default laws? The rationale is tied to the flawed assumptions that
premarital agreements are typically one-sided, unfair, and the result of a
fundamentally unfair bargaining process. As discussed in Part II, these assumptions
are inaccurate. Separate legal representation, we assume, will somehow make up for
these deficiencies and serve as evidence that the party in the weaker bargaining
position understood the agreement. As a Kansas practice guide explains: “The
presence of independent legal advice theoretically assures that both parties
understand the terms of the agreement, that it is voluntary, that they know what is
being waived, and what is being gained.”161
The use of independent representation as a proxy for determining
conscionability and voluntariness is misplaced. There is no conclusive evidence that
independent legal representation will prevent a spouse from entering into a one-sided
or unfair agreement. To the contrary, there are plenty of reported decisions where a
spouse with independent counsel signed an unfair agreement. For example, in
Sanford v. Sanford, wife signed a premarital agreement waiving rights to alimony
and property division at divorce.162 Under the agreement, the most the wife could
hope to receive at divorce was $144,000, paid in installments, and a condominium
in Sioux Falls. The financial disclosures showed that, at the time of marriage wife
had a net worth of $127,500 and husband had a net worth of $55 million.163 Similarly,
the wife in Sanderson v. Sanderson waived alimony and property division rights in

159. See, e.g., Ware v. Ware, 687 S.E.2d 382, 388 (W. Va. 2009) (“Thus, a prenuptial agreement is
invalid if either party lacked the opportunity to consult with independent legal counsel.”).
160. 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994).
161. LINDA D. ELROD & JAMES P. BUCHELE, 1 KANSAS LAW & PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW § 2:9,
Westlaw (database updated December 2015).
162. Stanford v. Stanford, 2005 SD 34, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d 283, 285.
163. Id. ¶ 4.
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her premarital agreement with a wealthier husband.164 The wife’s attorney advised
her that the agreement was one-sided and yet she decided to proceed anyway.165
Perhaps courts are simply more comfortable enforcing a harsh agreement where a
lawyer first warned the spouse of the potential inequity.
IV.

RULE 1.7—ANOTHER UNHELPFUL BARRIER

The rules of professional conduct provide additional barriers to the effective
entry into marriage contracts. In the estate-planning context, joint representation of
both spouses is a common and cost-effective occurrence that rarely raises significant
ethical dilemmas.166 Yet, in the context of a premarital agreement, joint
representation is verboten.167 Why is this the case?
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct—and in particular Rule 1.7—
prevent a lawyer from representing a client if a concurrent conflict of interest
exists.168 A concurrent conflict potentially exists any time that “the representation of
one client will be directly adverse to the other client; or . . . there is a significant risk
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client . . . .”169 Any time a lawyer seeks to engage
in dual representation—the representation of two different parties in a matter—a
concurrent conflict may exits. Whether a particular dual representation creates a
concurrent conflict depends, in part, on whether the clients’ interests are aligned. For
example, spouses purchasing a home together may typically be represented by the
same attorney because their interests are aligned with each other. Even when the
parties’ interests are not perfectly aligned, dual representation is permitted and often
advantageous. The Rule’s comment notes, “[f]or example, a lawyer may not
represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally
antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the
clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in
interest among them.”170 When a lawyer engages in dual representation in a nonlitigation matter his role becomes more like that of an intermediary. As an
intermediary, “[t]he role of the lawyer is to advise on relevant legal considerations,
suggest alternative ways of meeting common objectives, and draft instruments
necessary to accomplish the desired results.”171
A concurrent conflict does not necessarily preclude dual representation.
Rather, the lawyer may represent both clients if the following requirements are met:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
164. 2012-CA-01153-SCT (¶ 4) (Miss. 2014).
165. Id. ¶ 5.
166. See Lauren J. Wolven, Estate Planner’s Guide to Advising Couples About Divorce, 31 EST. PLAN.
427, 429–30 (2004); John R. Price, In Honor of Professor John Gaubatz: The Fundamentals of Ethically
Representing Multiple Clients in Estate Planning, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735, 745–47 (2008).
167. See Barbara Freedman Wand, Ethical Issues in Representing Husbands and Wives in Estate
Planning, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 90, 91 (2000); Wolven, supra note 167, at 430.
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
169. Id.
170. Id., at cmt. 28.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other
proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.172
In some instances, however, dual representation is prohibited even if both
parties agree to waive the conflict in accordance with Rule 1.7.173 These cases arise
when the conflict is “nonconsetnatable” and, therefore, cannot be cured by informed
client waiver.174 Whether a conflict is consentable or nonconsentable depends on a
variety of circumstances, including the type of legal work involved.
A.

Rule 1.7 and the Prohibition on Dual Representation in Premarital
Agreements

Only a handful of courts, scholars, and practitioners have seriously
considered the issue of dual representation in premarital agreements. Those who
have done so have typically compared the potential for conflict to divorce and have,
thus, concluded that the conflict is nonconsentable.175 This comparison is misplaced
because drafting premarital agreements “is the antithesis of what the matrimonial
attorney ordinarily does.”176 Divorce attorneys spend much of their time dissolving
failed partnerships—whereas premarital agreements seek to form successful ones.177
Divorce involves litigation—whereas premarital agreements are transactional in
nature. The role of the attorney should be much different in the two contexts. In other
words, “[c]onduct that might be appropriate in a divorce litigation will be
inappropriate in trying to form the relationship between the parties.”178
Opinions and scholarship adopting the view that divorce presents a
nonconsentable conflict further illustrate the distinctions between the two contexts.
In an advisory opinion, the Utah State Bar concluded that the “concurrent
representation of both parties in a divorce is an ethically unacceptable practice.”179
In support of its decision the Utah State Bar explain that: (1) “dual representation
tends to erode confidence in the courts as a tool for the equitable resolution of
disputes”; (2) “the court is presented with only one view of the facts in the divorce,
substantially reducing the court’s ability to protect both parties”; and (3) “dual
representation can foster actual impropriety by facilitating a fraud on the court.”180
The Vermont Supreme Court expressed similar concerns with respect to custody
decisions made incident to divorce.181 Courts are obligated to consider the best
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
173. See, e.g., Ware v. Ware 687 S.E.2d 382, 389 (W. Va. 2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 28 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
175. See, e.g., Ware, 687 S.E.2d at 389.
176. GARY N. SKOLOFF ET AL., DRAFTING PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS § X-B (2016).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee Opinion #116, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1992, at 21,
23.
180. Id. at 21.
181. Barbour v. Barbour, 505 A.2d 1217, 1220–21 (Vt. 1986).
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interest of the child in making custody decisions.182 Dual representation, however,
could impede this function because it “does not insure that a full and complete
presentation of the relevant factors relating to custody will occur.”183 None of these
justifications, however, seem to dictate a prohibition on dual representation in the
drafting of a premarital agreement because premarital agreements do not require
court approval or other involvement.
Yet, this distinction has traditionally been ignored. In Ware v. Ware, the
court noted that it had previously held that dual representation was never permitted
in divorce proceedings.184 The court then reasoned that dual representation in the
premarital agreement setting was likewise nonconsentable:
Like divorce actions, the nature of prenuptial agreements is such
that the parties’ interests are fundamentally antagonistic to one
another. Indeed, the purpose of a prenuptial agreement is to
preserve the property of one spouse, thereby preventing the other
from obtaining that to which he or she might otherwise be legally
entitled. In this circumstance, as in a divorce, “[t]he likelihood of
prejudice is so great with dual representation so as to make
adequate representation of both . . . [parties] impossible. . . . “
Accordingly, the Court holds that one attorney may not represent,
nor purport to counsel, both parties to a prenuptial agreement.185
Ware goes too far in assuming that a couple’s interests are “fundamentally
antagonistic to one another” in the negotiation of a premarital agreement and the
comparison to divorce is misplaced. Divorce is, of course, often antagonistic and
adversarial in nature. Properly drafted premarital agreements, however, are prepared
with an eye towards a successful relationship. The spouse’s interests are, in fact,
aligned and dual representation should be permitted in most cases. In executing a
premarital agreement spouses seek to decide in advance how they will manage and
allocate their resources. Yet, most authorities and practice guides seem to concur
with Ware.186 Because “[t]he negotiation of such an agreement often involves the
waiver of statutory rights otherwise available to spouses,” there exists “an actual
conflict of interest that requires separate counsel.”187
Notably, not all jurisdictions and scholars agree that divorce presents a
nonconsentable conflict of interest.188 Some have even suggested that an attorney

182. Id. at 1219.
183. Id. at 1221; accord In re Themelis, 83 A.2d 507 (Vt. 1951).
184. Ware v. Ware, 687 S.E.2d 382, 389 (W. Va. 2009).
185. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Walden v. Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 505 (W. Va. 1993)).
186. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency & Delegation: The Ethics of Marital
Representation, 22 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 97, 101 (1998) (recommending separate representation when the
“spouses’ interests are in conflict” such as when “a man and woman who intend to marry want to execute
a prenuptial agreement”).
187. Wand, supra note 168, at 91.
188. See, e.g., Burton Young & Lori H. Bienstock, Every Lawyer’s Danger Zone - Beware: Conflicts
of Interest Can Arise from Seemingly Innocent Actions, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1983, at 8, 10 (noting that
“[t]he Missouri, Oregon, and Colorado State Bar Associations . . . permit dual representation in divorce
actions if there are prior agreements concerning certain issues of custody, settlement, and division of
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could serve as a mediator to the divorce action—representing neither party and acting
as a sort of independent third party.189 Further, the mediator may also be able to
represent both parties in the preparation of the ultimate settlement agreement and
court pleadings.190 Utah accepted this approach—despite its per se bar on dual
representation in divorce litigation—provided that the parties give informed consent,
the lawyer can reasonably believe the dual representation will not adversely affect
either client, and the spouses are committed to the settlement with no remaining
points of contention.191 Notwithstanding the recent reconsideration of conflicts in the
divorce context, states seem to be hesitant to reconsider conflicts in the premarital
agreement context.
B.

The Estate Planning Model—A Better Alternative?

Estate planners wrestled with the issue of dual representation in the 1990’s
and, in so doing, promulgated workable and sensible guidelines interpreting the
Rules of Professional Conduct192 As explained in more detail in Part V, the estate
planning approach provides an alternative, and better, approach to premarital
agreements. Because “estate planning is fundamentally nonadversarial in nature,”
different ethical considerations are implicated than are in litigation.193 Furthermore,
“the role of the married couple as a unit for many societal purposes suggests . . . that
it is appropriate to view the couple as unified in goals and interests until shown
otherwise.”194 The fact that the spouses may have some differing interests of
objectives should not preclude the representation of both spouses so long as their
overall objectives are aligned.195 Marriage does not automatically “suggest a
limitation on the lawyer’s duties of independent judgment and loyalty.”196 Only if
there is a substantial risk that a conflict of interest will arise is it necessary for the
lawyer to obtain a waiver or to decline to engage in the dual representation.197
Representing both spouses can, of course, raise some ethical questions.
Does the lawyer have two separate attorney-client relationships—one with each

property”); accord Steven C. Bowman, Idaho’s Decision on Divorce Mediation, 26 IDAHO L. REV. 547,
561–62 (1989/1990).
189. See Bowman, supra note 189, at 562–66.
190. E.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion 736 (Jan. 3, 2001), 2001 WL 670915.
191. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Opinion Number 05-03 (Sept. 30, 2005), 2005 WL
3779039.
192. See Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, Comments and Recommendations
on the Lawyer’s Duties in Representing Husband and Wife, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765 (1994)
[hereinafter Special Study Committee]; THE AM. COLL. OF TR. AND ESTATE COUNSEL FOUND.,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter ACTEC
COMMENT].
193. ACTEC COMMENT, supra note 193, at 91; accord Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners:
An Essay on Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
313, 352–54 (1996); Daniel Hoffheimer, Professionalism in Estate Planning, Trust, and Probate Law, 14
OHIO PROB. L.J. 84 (2004).
194. Special Study Committee, supra note 193, at 779.
195. See ACTEC COMMENT, supra note 193, at 91–96.
196. Special Study Committee, supra note 193, at 779.
197. Id. at 780.
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client?198 Or, does the lawyer represent the spouses together as joint clients?199 The
answer to this question could affect questions of confidentiality and disclosure.200
Although the authorities differ on the precise answer to nature of the representation,
they tend to agree on how a lawyer should proceed in representing both spouses.201
The lawyer should notify the spouses of the ground rules from the outset.202
Specifically, the lawyer ought to explain the advantages and disadvantages of shared
representation.203 The lawyer should also explain that he will adopt a policy of full
and mutual disclosure of information to both spouses.204
This should be a model for how we treat premarital agreements. Estate
planning and premarital agreements are analogous. Estate planning plans for what
happens after the death of a person and a premarital contract plans for what happens
after the death of a marriage. These two similar situations should be approached in a
similar fashion. Just as in estate planning, the attorney should advise both the
husband and wife of the implications of joint representation.205 The couple works
together with the one attorney to create a tailored agreement that suits them
personally.206 There would not be a draft of the agreement until after the couple has
discussed what is important to them and their future together.207
V.

THE COLLABORATIVE APPROACH

The validity of premarital agreements should not turn on separate legal
representation or financial disclosure. Neither requirement has proven particularly
helpful in assessing whether spouses have freely executed an agreement. They have,
however, proven quite successful in increasing the barriers to entry into premarital
agreements. These requirements have also proven successful in helping to perpetuate
outdated gender stereotypes in the courts. Given that these requirements were
essentially imported from the divorce setting—a setting that is in every way the
antithesis of a successful premarital agreement—this is hardly surprising.
Lawyers cost money, and “[s]eparate lawyers means additional expense for
the clients even though the additional protection is often unnecessary.”208 Requiring
two attorneys can make the process unnecessarily contentious and, in many
instances, may be counterproductive.209 A premarital agreement should be based on

198. See Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 187, at 102.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 102–103.
201. See id.
202. See EVE PREMINGER ET AL., NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES: TRUSTS AND ESTATES PRACTICE IN
NEW YORK § 6:126 (2015–16 ed. 2015); GERRY BEYER, 10 TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: TEXAS LAW OF
WILLS § 53.7 (3rd ed. 2002).
203. See PREMINGER, supra note 203, at § 6:126; BEYER, supra note 203, at § 53.7.
204. See PREMINGER, supra note 203, at § 6:127.
205. See id.
206. See Donna Beck Weaver, The Collaborative Law Process for Prenuptial Agreements, 4 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 337 (2004).
207. See id.
208. Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 187, at 101.
209. Id. at 102.
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a relationship of “mutual trust and confidence” by the couple.210 Using a single
attorney to represent the couple would help build this trust and confidence. Details
of the couple’s future would be discussed openly. This openness and honesty builds
trust at the beginning of the couple’s marriage. It also obviates the need for a specific
disclosure of financial assets because such disclosure would be a part of that process.
Mandating that a couple obtain separate representation takes something that
should be a team decision between the future spouses and transforms it into
something more along the lines of an adversarial event. It is this adversarial nature
of premarital agreements that may be deterring couples from considering them.211
Using one attorney to represent the couple would make drafting a premarital
agreement a collaborative team event by allowing the couple to work together to
draft the contract.212 This not only takes the adversarial nature out of drafting a
premarital agreement, but it also requires the couple to discuss major sources of
disagreement before entering marriage and provide for better communication about
finances once the couple is married.213
Ethical considerations are different in the dual representation/collaborative
model. As discussed above, estate planning provides a better comparison for
interpreting the applicable ethical considerations. In applying Rule 1.7 to dual
representation in premarital agreements, the spouses should be presumed to have the
same goals and interests. The fact that the spouses may be altering their default rights
should not automatically be viewed as creating a conflict of interest. At the outset,
the lawyer should explain the following to the spouses:
1.
That they each have the right to seek separate, independent legal
representation; and the benefits of doing so.
2.
That the lawyer is not acting as an advocate for either spouse.
Rather, he is acting more as a mediator to facilitate the spouses reaching a mutually
beneficial agreement.
3.
That all communications shared by either spouse with the lawyer
will be shared with the other spouse.
4.
That both spouses must work together to determine what the terms
of their agreement should be.
It would be wise for the lawyer to ask the spouses to sign a waiver and
acknowledgement attesting to the forgoing—in accordance with Rule 1.7; however,
such waiver is probably not necessary in most cases.
In his first meeting with the clients, the lawyer should explain the default
marital property rules in general terms—including alimony, equitable distribution,
elective share rights, and community property rights. The lawyer should also inquire
into the following:
1.
Their reasons for seeking a premarital agreement.
2.
The assets, debts, and earning capacity of the spouses.

210. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962).
211. See Weaver, supra note 207.
212. See Weaver, supra note 207.
213. See Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 887, 895 (1997).
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3.
How the spouses plan to manage their money during marriage and
contribute to the expenses of the marriage and family.
4.
What rights each spouse should have in the earnings and property
of the other spouse—including retirement funds and the family home.
5.
What rights a spouse should have if he or she discontinues work
for any reason—to care for minor children, care for aging family members, to pursue
educational goals, etc.
6.
How the spouses believe the property and debts should be divided
at death or divorce.
Many spouses will not be able to answer these questions with specificity in
their first meeting with the lawyer. To that end, once the lawyer understands the
couple’s shared goals and has a general picture of their assets, debts, and earning
potential, the lawyer should give the spouses a “homework assignment.” The lawyer
should ask the couple to discuss the forgoing questions and to send him their written
answers as well as any additional questions they may have. This approach has several
benefits. First, the lawyer and the spouses have a written record of the issues
discussed in the preparation of the premarital agreement and proof of the joint
involvement of both spouses in the decision making process. This proof may be
helpful if a dispute later arises regarding the validity of the agreement or its
interpretation. This approach also helps to insure that both spouses are fully engaged
in the process and understand the implications of their agreement. Second, and more
importantly, by facilitating this conversation the lawyer has helped both spouses
better define and communicate their expectations at the outset of the marriage.
If, at any point, the lawyer has reservations about the circumstances
surrounding the agreement or its contents, he should withdraw from the
representation. For example, the lawyer may determine that one spouse is coercing
or otherwise domineering the other spouse in making decisions against his or her
interest. The lawyer may realize that the spouses are asking for an agreement that—
in light of their assets and resources—is one-sided and unfair to the other spouse.
The lawyer may determine that one spouse is not fully engaged in the process or is
too reliant on the other spouse. Any of these circumstances may indicate that the
lawyer should withdraw from the representation.
CONCLUSION
The law and the profession should encourage couples to enter into
premarital agreements and to do so in a collaborative and productive manner. The
barriers that have been erected to protect a spouse in a weaker bargaining position
prohibit this from occurring and cause more harm than good. The barriers—financial
disclosure and independent legal representation—routinely fail to accomplish any
meaningful protection. They are also premised on outdated, sexist, and unsupported
assumptions—assumptions which are reiterated by courts and practice guides thus
reinforcing unhelpful stereotypes. A collaborative approach, one in which both
spouses consult with a single lawyer who helps guide them through the process of
outlining their joint goals and expectations, is the better approach. It is better suited
to the realities of modern marriage and it facilitates the entry into effective premarital
agreements without an antagonistic process.

